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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Sed Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?1
Civilians have been able to file complaints against officers of the New
York City Police Department (NYPD) with the Civilian Complaint Review
Board2 (CCRB) since May 1953. 3 In the early years, the CCRB was a part of
the NYPD, complaints were investigated by specially selected police
officers, and their investigative findings were reviewed by a board composed
of three deputy commissioners, 4 the civilian managers of the NYPD.
Findings and recommendations in cases with substantiated misconduct were
sent to the police commissioner who had-and still has-the sole power to
discipline an officer. Not much changed between 1955 and 1966-the CCRB
moved its offices from a police facility to a more neutral site and another
deputy commissioner was added to the board. 5
In 1966, then-Mayor John Lindsay sought to add four civilian members
to the CCRB, creating a "mixed" board 6 which did not sit well with police
* Associate Professor and Associate Director of the Saltman Center for Conflict
Resolution, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. From
December 1996 to May 2005, Mr. Patterson was the Director of Mediation and, from
2001 onward, the Director of Communications and Dispute Resolution at New York
City's Civilian Complaint Review Board. This document does not represent the official
view of the CCRB; rather it is the author's remembrance of his experiences during his
more than eight years at the agency.
1 JUVENAL, SATIRES VI, at 347-48 ("But who is to guard the guards themselves?").
2 Some people may be confused by the board's name into thinking civilians were
part of it even at the beginning. The name Civilian Complaint Review Board should
really be read backwards: it was a board of police executives that reviewed complaints
made by civilians.
3 JULY-DEC. N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REv. BD. STATUS REP. 7 (1993).
4 Id. Deputy Commissioners of the NYPD are non-uniformed members of the
department. The first deputy commissioner, next in authority to the police commissioner,
has always been a former police officer; other deputy commissioners are not former
police officers.
5 Id.
6Id.
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representatives. The police unions succeeded in turning the issue into a ballot
question and spent much money and effort making their views known to the
citizenry. In November 1966, the public voted down any expansion of the
board to include civilians. 7
But times change and by 1987 Mayor Ed Koch was able, with the help of
the city council, to add civilian members to the board although that board and
the investigative process were still a part of the NYPD. Then came the 1988
Tompkins Square riots. 8 Squatters were living in the park, drug use was
obvious, and the merchants and local residents wanted the park cleaned up.
The police obliged, but in a most abusive fashion. The city council
subsequently took up the issue of making the board independent of the
NYPD, passing Local Law 1 of 1993 on December 19, 1992. 9 The mayor
approved the law on January 5, 1993,10 and on July 5 the CCRB was finally
an entity in its own right, no longer tethered to the police department it was
supposed to oversee. 11
It was a difficult birth. The police department withdrew all of its officer-
managers and investigators, but left the cases they were handling. 12 The
7Id.
8 On August 7, 1988, a riot erupted in Tompkins Square Park, in the heart of the
Ninth Precinct. More than fifty people were injured, and dramatic videotapes showed the
police, with badge numbers covered, indiscriminately beating civilians. The police were
widely condemned: 121 civilian complaints were filed, six officers were indicted on
criminal charges, seventeen were charged with departmental misconduct, and the precinct
captain was disciplined. Book Note, The Eyes of the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1390, 1393
n.13 (1990) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL (1988)).
9 JULY-DEC. N.Y. CrrY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BD. STATUS REP. app. A, 3
(1993).
10 Id.
11 Id. at 21.
12 Id.
The CCRB's change-over on July 5th, 1993... has not been without its share
of problems. Upon its initiation, the new CCRB inherited a docket of 1,085
cases which were either awaiting review by the Board or still under
investigation. The withdrawal of the Police Department's managers,
investigators and support staff, comprising about 50% of the agency's total
personnel, left the new CCRB with investigatory teams of six members each
(reduced from twelve) and with a severe shortage of managerial
personnel.... [T]he agency is also moving to restore and supplement the office
equipment and technology returned to the Police Department at the time of
transition.
Id.
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unions directed their members not to appear for questioning. It took years to
get out from under the backlog caused by the former 13 and a court to correct
the latter, 14 but eventually things settled down. The first administration at the
CCRB labored under much duress and the growing pains were sharp. By
1996, there was a new administration and a new vision for how the agency
should grow. 15
II. WHAT DOES THE CCRB OFFER?
The CCRB is, essentially, an investigative agency. A complaint is
filed-by mail (mail/email), phone (direct/to NYPD/311),16 or in person (at
any precinct/at the CCRB's offices)-and it is assigned to one of eight
investigative teams. Each team has a manager, supervisor, and assistant
supervisor, along with twelve to thirteen investigators. Managers have prior
law enforcement experience, but not with the NYPD.
Team managers assign the case to an investigator who must try to contact
the complainant within 24 hours. 17 Clearly, this is not always possible. For
one thing, many complainants fail to give accurate information like a phone
number and address; some refuse to answer the investigator's calls and
letters. For those citizens who want to follow up on their complaint, a formal
interview is required, either at the CCRB offices or some other convenient
location. 18 If the police officer was identified, that officer is summoned for
an interview. If not, the investigator requests police records to try to make an
identification.
13 MEL P. BARKAN, CHAIRMAN, JAN.-DEC. N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV.
BD. SEMIANNUAL STATUS REP., at ix-x (1997) (stating that "the CCRB reduced the total
docket by 25 0/o--from 3,325 cases in 1996 to 2,493 in 1997. In addition, it reduced the
backlog of cases over a year old by 85.2 0/--from 1,206 in 1996 to 178 in 1997.").
14 Caruso v. Civilian Complaint Rev. Bd., 602 N.Y.S.2d 487, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).
15 This new vision still holds under the current administration led by Florence L.
Finkle as executive director.
16 See, e.g., Joshua Brustein, 311 's Growing Pains, GoTHAM GAZETTE, July 25,
2005, http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/issueoftheweek/20050725/200/1490. Under
Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, the city implemented the 311 phone number program to
handle any call not an emergency that should be handled by dialing the long-available
911. The availability of 311 made it far easier to reach the appropriate city agency that
could deal with a caller's problem.
1 7 See, e.g., JAN.-DEC. N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BD. STATUs REP. 5
(2005), http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/ccrbann2004.pdf.
18 Identified witnesses are treated in the same fashion; police witnesses are required
to be interviewed at the CCRB. Id.
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Once all identified parties in the complaint have been interviewed and
any pertinent documents have either been submitted or subpoenaed, the
investigator drafts a closing report "which includes a summary and analysis
of the evidence and recommended dispositions for each allegation raised by
the complaint."' 9 This report may also include legal analysis involving
search and seizure law or opinions of the city's administrative law judges
who rule on police misconduct cases. The report, along with the entire case
file, is submitted to a three-member panel of the board for their review.20
Only the board can make a final determination of the dispositions in a case.
Allegations in a case may be disposed of as substantiated (evidence
indicates the officer did what the complainant said), exonerated (the officer
did it, but was within his or her rights to do so), unfounded (the alleged
misconduct did not take place), and unsubstantiated (there is insufficient
evidence to apply any of the other findings to the allegation). 21 The standard
of proof in CCRB cases is the civil law standard, preponderance of the
evidence. 22
Copies of all cases with at least one substantiated allegation are sent to
the police commissioner for his disposition. To get a sense of how frequently
this occurs, consider that between 2000 and 2004, for example, annual
substantiation rates by case23 were between 7.8% and 16.3% of all fully
investigated cases.24 In the aggregate, 1,281 cases were substantiated out of
10,898 complaints fully investigated during those five years. 25 For the same
time period, slightly over half of the complaints closed (12,624, or 52.2% of
19 Id. at6.
20 Panels are composed of one board member from each designating entity; i.e., one
who was originally designated by the mayor, one by the police commissioner, and one by
the city council. See JAN.-DEC. N.Y. CITY CMLIAN COMPLAINT REV. BD. STATUs REP.
7-8 (2004), http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/ccrbann2003.pdf.
2 1 Id. at7.
22 Id. at 8.
23 Disposition rates can be calculated by case or by allegations. For substantiation
rates by case, the agency compares the number of complaints containing one or more
substantiated allegations to the number of complaints fully investigated during the
reporting period. For substantiation rates by allegations, the comparison is between the
actual number of substantiated allegations and the total number of allegations fully
investigated during the reporting period. Because most complaints contain multiple
allegations, the substantiation rate by case is generally higher than the rate by allegation.
See id. at 25-28.
2 4 JAN.-DEC. N.Y. CITY CIILIAN COMPLAINT REv. BD. STATUS REP. 83 (2005),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/ccrbann2004.pdf.
25 Id.
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the total 24,168 cases closed) were truncated 26 because the complainant was
unavailable, 27 uncooperative,28 or decided to withdraw the complaint.
The question of satisfaction with the agency's work is frequently raised.
There are really two types of satisfaction that must be considered:
satisfaction with the process offered by the agency and satisfaction with the
outcome. In any investigation, the CCRB should be able to satisfy both the
civilian and the police officer in terms of the process: the parties should feel
they were treated fairly, respectfully, and in a timely manner. In terms of the
outcome of the investigation with its four main possible outcomes, however,
at least one party is going to feel great dissatisfaction, and it is certainly
possible for that disappointment to be shared by both.
For instance, if the board substantiates an allegation, it is telling the
police officer it does not believe their story. If it exonerates the officer or
finds the allegation unfounded, the board is telling the civilian that their
perception of the incident was faulty or he simply lied-two results that are
reasonably sure to engender anger on the part of most complainants. The
worst possible outcome for a civilian and police officer is an unsubstantiated
disposition. Not only will neither person feel believed, but the officer will
have the unsubstantiated disposition counted against them by the department
26 Id. This 50% truncation rate has existed for many years and has varied little. One
reason for it may be the complainant's expectations. In 1988, the Vera Institute of Justice
did a study of the CCRB. MICHELE SVIRIDOFF & JEROME E. MCELROY, VERA INSTITUTE
OF JUSTICE, PROCESSING COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE IN NEW YORK CITY (1989). In
researching the factors that influenced variations in levels of complainant satisfaction
researchers queried people who had their complaints fully investigated, conciliated (an ex
parte process where officers met with a supervising officer to discuss the complaint
against them and received re-instruction), and those that withdrew their complaint. Id. at
2. They sought to identify the goals civilians had when they filed their complaints and
match them with the complainant's level of satisfaction. In looking into civilian
objectives for filing complaints, they found that, for the population queried: (1) 19% of
those people who withdrew their complaints had serious expectations, wanting the officer
to lose his or her job or to be severely punished; (2) 60% had moderate goals, wanting the
officer to be reprimanded but not to lose the job; and (3) 21% had mild goals which were
met by the mere filing of the complaint. Id. at 9. If these breakdowns are applicable for
all complainants, it could help explain why so many people fail to follow through on their
complaint.
2 7 JAN.-DEC. N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BD STATUS REP. 6-7 (2004),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/ccrbann2004.pdf. 'Unavailable' is a disposition
applied when the CCRB investigator cannot locate the complainant based on the contact
information the person either gave or failed to give.
2 8 Id. at 7. Complainants are designated "uncooperative" when the investigator
knows the contact information is correct but the person fails to reply to repeated phone
calls and letters, or fails to appear for scheduled interviews.
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whenever their personnel history is reviewed. 29 This happens when the police
officer is up for promotion, transfer, or change of detail.
Investigation is, without question, the agency's prime purpose.30 To that
end, the bulk of resources go toward strengthening the investigative staff. For
example, if a clerical employee resigns or is terminated, agency management
may try, if at all feasible, to move any money that remains available in that
line31 to the investigative lines, in an attempt to hire more investigators or to
continue to pay the ones already hired.
At the same time, the mediation unit receives very little of the agency's
resources. It has a small staff: one director and three mediation associates
who are former investigators invited to join the unit. Lack of resources is
detrimental to the program. Contrary to Mayor Bloomberg's Orwellian
mantra in fiscally austere times, you really cannot do more with less.
III. How DOES A COMPLAINT FIND ITS WAY TO MEDIATION?
I came to the CCRB at the end of 1996, hired as the director of
mediation. In the agency's enabling legislation, there is a provision that
states: "[t]he board shall establish a mediation program pursuant to which a
complainant may voluntarily choose to resolve a complaint by means of
informal conciliation." 32 Before I arrived, the process for mediating
complaints had been negotiated between the police department, the city law
department, and the CCRB; my task was to implement it.
It is a cumbersome process. Each day, one of the eight investigative
teams is on intake duty. All cases that come in that day, in whatever format,
are assigned to that team. Team management reviews the complaints and
29 Communicated by senior staff members at the CCRB and members of the liaison
team from the NYPD's Disciplinary Assessment Unit (now the Department Advocate's
Office).
30 Transcript of Public Session, N.Y. CITY COMPLAINT REV. BD. at 5 (June 14,
2006), available at http://nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/cc_2006 06_14.pdf. The executive
director reported at the June 2006 board meeting that, as of May 31, the CCRB "had a
full-time head count of 175: 137 investigators and 38 non-investigative staff members,
including Executive staff members." This means that slightly more than 78% of the
agency's employees are investigators.
31 A "line" is a budgetary term that refers to a position that is funded by the city
budget. If someone leaves before the fiscal year is up, the money allocated for the
position can be shifted to another position. Thus, should a manager depart, the salary
earmarked for the balance of the year may be divided among two or more investigative
slots, allowing the agency to increase staff.
32 New York City Charter, Ch. 18-A § 440(c)(4) (2004).
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determines whether a case is eligible for mediation. 33 Cases found to be
mediable 34 require the complainant's consent before going further.
Investigators are trained to present mediation and investigation objectively to
complainants so they can make an informed decision as to what process to
select, but also to point out the benefits of mediating in particular cases. They
have also been trained to handle civilian objections. For example, a
complainant may say she does not want to sit down at the same table with a
police officer because she "never wants to see that cop again." An
investigator would inform her that should the complaint be substantiated,
there is always the possibility of an administrative trial to decide the matter,
where the complainant would not only see the officer again, but be cross-
examined by the officer's attorney. Declining to mediate is not always an
effective means of banishing the offending officer from a complainant's life.
If the complainant agrees to mediate, the case is transferred to the
mediation unit. There, staff members review the case for suitability.35 Names
of officers in these cases are reviewed at the NYPD's Department
Advocate's Office (DAO) 36 to determine if they are acceptable candidates
for mediation.37 Once an officer is vetted, the case file is sent to the board's
33 All investigators are given training in the CCRB's mediation program when they
start work at the agency. Refresher training is given periodically.
34 NEW YORK CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BD., MEDIATION,
http://nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/mediation.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2006). For a case to be
mediable there can be no allegation of a personal injury or damage to property for which
a legal claim might be made. In addition, specific allegations are considered mediable.
These include force allegations of "physical force," abuse of authority, allegations
involving threats, all discourtesy (curses, nasty words and gestures), and offensive
language allegations (slurs of an ethnic, racial, gender, sexual orientation, religious, or
handicap nature).
35 Victor Voloshin, Director of Mediation New York City Civilian Complaint Review
Board, Jan.-Mar. 2006 POLICE PRACTICES REVIEW, 8,
http://www.parc.info/pubs/pdf/january-marchppr06.pdf. There is a difference between
eligibility, which is based on fulfilling the requirements of the guidelines, and suitability,
which deals with whether the case has any likelihood of success in mediation. Complaints
might fulfill the eligibility requirement-no injury or property damage, with all mediable
allegations-yet not be suitable; i.e., the complainant might be an emotionally disturbed
person (EDP), or indicate an absolute unwillingness to settle the dispute in any way other
that what he demands, or be a chronic complainant who files on the least provocation.
36 The Department Advocate's Office is the NYPD's legal unit, staffed by police
lawyers and officers.
37 In evaluating an officer for participation in mediation, the officer's entire record
would be reviewed. A history of other complaints (non-CCRB), or a poor attendance
record, or an on-going investigation of the officer by the department's Internal Affairs
Bureau, would preclude approving them for mediation.
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own alternative dispute resolution (ADR) committee for their review.38 If the
committee approves the case for mediation, the mediation unit notifies the
department to contact the officer to see if the officer would consent to
mediate. Only after the officer says yes can the unit begin to schedule a
mediation session.
At that point, the mediation associate begins what can be a tedious
process of trying to get the complainant, officer, and mediator to agree on a
date and time for the mediation. The agency tries to use a co-mediation
model, so at least four people have to be in agreement. This can be
exasperating for the associate who soon learns that most people are
incredibly busy.
Even after a date and time have been agreed to, it is possible that one or
the other party may not show up to the mediation session. Acceptable reasons
for nonappearance by the officer include being summoned to testify in court
(the directive to come to court to testify often is made the day before) or
involvement in an arrest earlier in the day. 39 More frustrating, though, is
nonappearance because the officer was never notified or just decided not to
come, which happens more often than the agency would like. The
complainants are also entitled not to appear if they have good reason. Good
reasons include the inability to find childcare or a transportation problem, but
do not include such excuses as, "It was raining and I didn't want to go out."40
For police officers who do not have just cause for missing the scheduled
mediation, the complainant always has the option of sending the case back
for a full investigation. For complainants who do not have just cause for
missing the session, the rule is simple: two unjustifiably missed mediations
and the case will be closed as "mediation attempted." The officer in such a
case gets the same benefits as if the case was successfully mediated.
38 As in other panels, the ADR committee has a mayoral designee, a city council
designee, and a police department designee. At the time of this writing the mayoral
designee is Professor Carol Liebman, director of the mediation clinic at Columbia
University School of Law. The police department member is Jules Martin, former chief
of the NYPD Housing Police, and the city council designee is Singee Lam, director of
intemational admissions at St. John's University. JAN.-DEC. N.Y. CITY CIUIAN
COMPLAINT REv. BD. STATUS REP., at viii (2006),
http://nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/ccrbann2005.pdf.
39 It was well known at the CCRB that police officers who have made an arrest are
required to complete a significant amount of paperwork relative to that arrest that takes
them off their post and takes precedence over other commitments, like mediation.
40 A complainant actually offered this excuse as the reason she was unable to appear
for her scheduled mediation.
196
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Assuming the parties and mediators all make it to the session, there are
three possible outcomes which are determined by the parties themselves. The
first possible outcome is "successfully mediated with a signed resolution
agreement." Another disposition is "successfully mediated without a signed
resolution agreement." Both of these outcomes mean the parties agreed that
they have resolved all of the issues between them, but the latter results in a
verbal agreement only. Finally, if any of the issues between the parties have
not been resolved, the outcome is "impasse" and the complainant has the
choice of either sending it back to investigation or withdrawing the
complaint.
IV. WHAT WORKS WELL?
A. What Works: Altering the Investigative Approach
One of the most important steps we took was to change the investigative
mindset. Investigators have the job of initially offering mediation to civilians.
This is hard for them to do because mediation is something they do not
know. When investigators begin working at the CCRB, they participate in a
three week training program run by the managers and senior staff.4 1
Originally, the bulk of that training was on investigative techniques and
practices. During the early years of the program, I was given a few hours to
talk to these neophytes about the mediation program. This turned out to be
insufficient.
In 2002, the new mediation coordinator, Gene Banducci, found himself
listening to many, many recorded phone conversations42 and noticed that
investigators never asked complainants what they wanted to see come out of
their complaint. They just assumed that the person complaining wanted an
investigation and proceeded down that path. As mentioned previously,
research suggests that not everyone wants the same result from filing a
complaint.43 Banducci proposed that investigators ask complainants just what
they would like to get out of filing the complaint, and wisely, he also
41 New York City Civilian Review Complaint Board, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/faq.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2006). New investigators
take part in an intensive three-week training course that focuses on the CCRB's
jurisdiction and rules, interviewing techniques, methods for acquiring documentary
evidence, structure of the police department, and patrol guide procedures.
42 All interviews and phone conversations are taped as a matter of agency policy, so
there is no question about what a person has said.
43 See SVIRIDOFF & MCELROY, supra note 26, at 9.
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suggested that question be asked after the complainants had given their story
about the incident. Eventually, we agreed that the best technique for dealing
with someone with a mediable complaint was to ask for the story of the
complaint first, then provide an objective description of the two processes
offered at the CCRB (investigation and mediation), and then wind up by
questioning the complainant about what they want to get from filing the
complaint.
Complainants can answer that question in many ways. They may want an
apology, a chance to tell the officer how they felt, or an opportunity to
explain why the officer was mistaken. Other complainants may want the
officer to be fired, severely punished, or simply spoken to. Any of these
answers give an investigator a starting point to talk about how investigation
or mediation would probably be a better choice for them.
B. What Works: Handling Objections to the Mediation Process
But something more was needed. It was a good start to ask complainants
what they wanted as a result of filing a complaint, because investigators
could then use the answer to help the complainants see how mediation would
suit their needs better. What the investigators had difficulty with was dealing
with complainants' objections. This made sense because the investigative
staff simply did not have the background in mediation that would allow them
to counter civilians' arguments.
The executive director of the CCRB at the time, Florence L. Finkle,
decided that some form of instruction must be developed to help
investigators counter civilian demurrals to mediation. She and I jointly wrote
a training program which presented the most common challenges civilians
made when offered mediation, and provided arguments that might refute or
at least blunt those objections. This particular training program was a great
help to the mediation program and did increase the number of cases
transferred to mediation.
As an example, a civilian might vigorously oppose mediating his
complaint if he believes the officer should be severely punished or fired for
what the complainant feels was a serious act of misconduct.44 In such a case,
the CCRB's training program would encourage the investigator to take the
complainant on a "reality walk." If the civilian takes the position that he
wants the officer fired, the training program would suggest that the
44 Interestingly, I found anecdotally that an initial demand for harsh punishment
does not necessarily preclude mediating the complaint. Most complainants were not
inextricably locked into a position, at least if we kept talking to them.
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investigator commiserate ("I can understand why you would feel this
way .... ") but point out that between July 1993 and December 2005, for
example, only eleven police officers were terminated as a direct result of a
substantiated CCRB complaint, although the agency fully investigated
26,021 complaints during that period.45 In addition, training would
recommend that the investigator also explain to the complainant that the
agency's substantiation rate (9.7% of all cases fully investigated had one or
more substantiated allegations for 2005), 46, while not dispositive, suggests the
odds are not good that their complaint will be substantiated from a purely
statistical perspective. And that is on top of an approximate 56% truncation
rate, so the number of cases in which the agency actually finds misconduct is
fairly small.47
People change their minds based on the amount of information available
to them. There is no reason to think that complainants are any different.
While there is no need for an investigator to refer to publicly available
information when talking to every complainant, objective statistical data
judiciously referenced can help a person make a better informed choice as to
what process would best meet their needs.
Sometimes objective statistics are not even necessary. Say, for example,
a person objects to mediation because he "never wants to see that cop again."
Such a position is quite understandable-the incident that gave rise to the
complaint may have made the civilian feel humiliated, like a child or a
criminal. The agency's training program recommends that, as mentioned
previously, the investigator explain to the complainant that, should the
complaint be substantiated, there is a chance that there will be an
administrative trial held at police headquarters, where he will have to face the
officer again and be questioned by the officer's attorney. The purpose of
giving the complainant such information is not to force him into any
particular choice. Most complainants are simply not aware of the possible
results of filing a complaint, and this new information is often enough to
prompt them to reconsider mediation since an investigation does not preclude
seeing the officer again.
45 E-mail from Marcos Soler of Statistics, N.Y. City Civilian Complaint Rev. Bd., to
Raymond W. Patterson, Associate Director of the Saltman Center for Conflict
Resolution, William S. Boyd School of Law (June 19, 2006) (on file with author).
4 6 JAN. N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REv. BD. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR'S REP. 8
(2006); http://nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/ed_2006 01.pdf.
47 Id. (noting that from January through December 2005, for example, there were
2,678 full investigations out of the 6,518 cases closed that year, with 260 cases having
one or more substantiated allegations. Of all the cases closed, 56% were truncated).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
While the training program seeks to assist investigators in dealing with
civilian objections to mediation, it is not able to handle all such objections. In
novel situations, we encouraged-as my successor, Victor Voloshin, still
does-that investigators either seek advice from the director of mediation, or
have a mediation staff member talk to the complainant directly. The goal of
all mediation training at the CCRB has always been-and still is-to help
complainants make the most informed choice possible when deciding how to
resolve the complaint.
C. What Works: Persuading the Police
Given the prior history of relations between the CCRB and the police, it
was only natural that the creators of the mediation process tried to find a way
to encourage officers to participate in mediation. They did this in two ways.
First, participation in the process was made voluntary for all parties, and
everyone had to agree to mediate for it to actually occur. Just like civilians,
officers always had the right to say no so they could not claim anything was
foisted upon them.
The second way involved modifying the officer's CCRB history, but this
requires some elaboration. One of the agency's major tasks, besides
investigating complaints, is to keep records,48 and every active police officer
has a CCRB history-a computerized document that can be printed or
viewed online and that lists certain pedigree information about the officer,49
the case numbers of all complaints filed against the officer, 50 a brief
description of each individual allegation, and the disposition of each
allegation. This document is also available to police department
management-commanding officers, integrity control officers, 51 DAO staff,
and members of the police commissioner's office.
48 See Debra Livingston, Professor of Law, Columbia Univ., Citizen Review of
Police Complaints: Four Critical Dimensions of Value, Address to the Eighth Annual
Conference of National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (Nov. 1,
2002) (transcript available at http://www.nacole.org/livingston12-02.htm). Debra
Livingston was a former member of the board at the CCRB.
49 For example, name, age, race/ethnicity, rank, date appointed, command
assignment.
50 If no complaints were ever filed against an officer, the history may be blank in the
complaint area, but this happens infrequently. During a career that usually spans twenty
years in the five boroughs of New York City and given the nature of the citizenry, it
would be unusual for a police officer not to have a complaint filed against him or her.
51 A precinct integrity control officer is responsible for making sure the officers in
that command follow the law.
200
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An officer's CCRB history is considered part of the officer's central
personnel index (CPI), along with other police department documentation,
like attendance records and records of other complaints not under the
jurisdiction of the CCRB, for example. As such, whenever the officer is up
for promotion, change of detail, or review for any reason, the CCRB history
is an important and integral part of that review for a number of reasons. For
one, the police department has a series of monitoring programs in place for
officers it finds to be not upholding the standards of the department.
Placement in a monitoring program, where an officer becomes the subject of
greater supervision, is considered detrimental to the officer's career. All
officers are evaluated monthly according to formulas developed by the
department, and some require data from the officer's CCRB history. Board
dispositions of substantiated complaints-the officer was found to have
committed misconduct by the CCRB-and unsubstantiated complaints-the
CCRB could not find enough evidence to say the officer committed
misconduct, but could not say the officer did not commit misconduct-are
counted against an officer in those formulas. For instance, one monitoring
formula I was aware of looked for officers with six or more substantiated or
unsubstantiated complaints in the last five years. Those officers that match
the requirements are placed in the monitoring program, where they remain
for at least a year and often longer. 52
When the original mediation process was drafted, the NYPD and CCRB
agreed that in successfully mediated cases, the agency would "mask" the
description of the allegations on the computer so that police department staff
would not be able to see them. Thus, for a complaint that was mediated
successfully, the entry on the officer's history would just show the complaint
number and a disposition of "mediated. '53
The most important "carrot" held out to persuade police officers to
consider mediation was Operations Order 24, issued under then-Police
Commissioner Howard Safir.54 The key provision in this order was § 14
which stated that dispositions of mediations would not be counted against
52 Telephone Interview with Lt. Timothy I. Murphy, DAO liaison, N.Y. City
Civilian Complaint Bd. (June 19, 2006).
53 While the allegations would be masked for a successfully mediated complaint, the
CCRB still maintained them in its database for statistical purposes. Data is never
discarded.
5 4 NEW YORK POLICE DEP'T OPERATIONS ORDER No. 24 (1998) (The original
operations order was issued on April 9, 1998. It has since been revised and renamed
Operations Order 13).
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officers whenever their personnel files were being reviewed. 55 That meant,
for example, that an officer with five complaints on her CCRB history, who
successfully mediated the sixth complaint against her, still had only five
complaints with respect to the monitoring formulas. This was a tremendous
incentive for police officers to consider mediating complaints, and the CCRB
noticed that more police officers began to agree to mediation after the
operations order was issued.56
It was frankly difficult for the mediation unit staff to understand why
officers would turn down the opportunity to mediate. If they were successful,
the allegations in the complaint would be masked and the complaint would
not be counted against them. In addition, everything said in the mediation
session was confidential, they would have a chance to be heard, and they
might even learn something. And if the mediation was not successful, the
case would either return to investigations or be withdrawn. Of course, it
made sense for an officer to decline to mediate if the officer had proof
positive that the complaint was spurious. But if they did commit the
misconduct alleged, the officer would have a much better chance of
surviving it unscathed by mediating.
D. What Works: Flexible Scheduling
One thing the mediation staff learned quickly was just how difficult it
was to get people together at the CCRB at the same time. Officers might not
be able to make the mediation sessions because they arrested someone the
night before and were stuck doing the paperwork,57 were injured in the line
of duty, were on sick leave, or were notified the day before to testify in court.
55 Id. at 2 ("14. Any complaint that is mediated will be so noted on a uniformed
member of the service's CCRB complaint history and all allegations (force, abuse of
authority, discourtesy, offensive language, etc.) will be deleted from the CCRB complaint
history. In addition, a civilian complaint which is mediated, will not be considered in the
event that a uniformed member of the service's personnel record is reviewed.").
56 JAN.-DEC. N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REv. BD. STATUS REP. 23 (2005),
http://nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/ccrbann2005.pdf (noting that officers accept mediation with
greater frequency than complainants. In 2004, for example, 69% of the officers offered
mediation accepted it); N.Y. CITY CVILIAN COMPLAINT REv. BD. ANALYSIS OF
MEDIATION PROGRAM 2004 COMPLAINTS [AS OF 11/30/05] (2005). That same year, 47%
of those complainants offered mediation accepted.
57 Staff can get an officer's shift changed so that he may attend the mediation. Thus,
an officer working the 4-12 shift last night might be reassigned to the day tour today to
be able to attend mediation. It is in such a scenario that an arrest the night before might
cause the officer to fail to appear at the CCRB the next day.
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Civilians had even more reasons: they were leaving the country for two
months, they were pregnant, the babysitter did not show up, they forgot the
date, they just started a new job and had no time off, they were hospitalized,
their elderly parent was hospitalized, or their young child was sick. Through
all of those excuses, the staff persevered and kept trying to find a mutually
acceptable time to meet because the amicable resolution of the complaint was
their major goal.
Such thinking is somewhat heretical at the CCRB. The agency is judged,
and judges its employees, on timeliness. If it takes, on average, nine and a
half months to complete an investigation, 58 management might press the
investigators to do it in eight months, while not neglecting fairness and
quality. The focus on timeliness goes back to the CCRB's early days as an
independent agency. In its very first status report for July through December
1993, a section on performance evaluation stated:
The Board contends that the measure of the CCRB's accomplishments
should be its effectiveness and efficiency in resolving any submitted
complaint.... The second proposed indicator, "efficiency," refers to the
length of time required for the conclusion of a full investigation. Although
not mandated by the enabling legislation, the Board's objective is to
complete a full investigation of a case within 90 days and to decide the case
within 30 days thereafter. Clearly, the more expeditious the process the
more satisfying it will be for the civilian complainant and the subject
officer. In these matters, justice delayed may indeed be justice denied. 59
Cases that were five months old or older from the date of filing were
considered part of a backlog, and the size of the backlog was to trouble the
CCRB to the present day.
It was an ambitious goal, and the board hewed to it in the next six-month
status report, even in the face of evidence strongly suggesting the goal was
unattainable, declaring, "Although investigations are now taking
approximately eight months to complete, the goal of completion of an
investigation within 90 days with another 30 days for review and disposition
by the Board remains reasonable. '60 But by the publication of the third status
report, the truth became clear to agency management:
58 JAN.-JUNE N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BD. STATUS REP. 13 (2005),
http://nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/ccrbsemi2005.pdf.
5 9 JuLY-DEC. N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BD. STATUS REP. 23-24 (1993).
60 JAN. -JUNE N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BD. STATUS REP. 24 (1994).
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As recently as the previous Status Report... this four-month closure
parameter was characterized as a "reasonable" goal. Yet, from the
beginning of the new CCRB's operations, the 120-day objective has rarely
been met.... The "90 + 30" objective is now not realistic given the
CCRB's present operational circumstances. The framers of the enabling
legislation, although cognizant of the 90-day objective, chose not to impose
such a restriction on the agency. The original board believed "90 + 30" to
be a reasonable and workable objective.... However, espousing 90 days
for completion of an investigation when it may take three to four weeks to
obtain the necessary paperwork from the Police Department and another
two to three weeks to schedule an officer for an investigatory interview, or
when there are multiple subject officers or witnesses, creates false
expectations and has the potential to undermine the credibility of the
agency. It also should be noted that the "90 + 30" objective was not realistic
under the prior CCRB-CCIB [Civilian Complaint Investigation Bureau].
More often than not, final disposition on cases was not achieved until many
months after the 90-day period. 6 1
While the July-December 1994 status report went on to say that the
CCRB should not be satisfied with complaints that take seven to nine months
to investigate and should try to improve timeliness, 62 there was clearly an
acknowledgement that four months was an unreasonable time period to allow
for investigations on average. 63 Unfortunately, the definition of backlogged
cases as being those five months old or older is still operational at the
CCRB,64 and the agency continues to be criticized for it, both by detractors
and its own board members.
Since investigations were consistently judged on their timeliness, it was
only natural that mediations would be judged on timeliness too. But trying to
maintain a complainant's interest in going forward with mediation requires
different skills than investigating. Mediation associates need to develop a
rapport with the complainant and then maintain it, because the approval
process does take some time and obstacles to scheduling can arise repeatedly.
61 JULY-DEC. N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REv. BD. STATUS REP. 7-8 (1994).
62 Id. at 9.
63 I observed board members still demanding that investigations be completed in
ninety days as late as 2002. I am reminded of A.H. Weiler's statement in a privately
circulated memorandum of the New York Times: "Nothing is impossible for the man
who doesn't have to do it himself."
64 JAN.-DEC. N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REv. BD. STATUS REP. 217 (2001)
http://nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/ccrbann200l.pdf (defining of Operational Backlog. The
agency has never revised this definition, but has stopped referring to it in its public
reports).
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Associates must work to keep up the civilian's interest in going forward,
since so much effort and resources are expended just getting the case to the
point of scheduling. This led to staff keeping cases open when agency
management believed, in the interest of timeliness, they should have been
closed. But the persistence of the mediation associates often paid off
handsomely in successfully mediated complaints and parties pleased with the
process. 65 Still, the time to complete a mediation increased because many
cases were kept open for months, leading to criticism by upper management.
As long as efficiency is held in more regard than complainant/officer
satisfaction, this will be a source of irritation for those running the mediation
program and agency management alike.
E. What Works: The Session Itself
The most powerful, positive aspect of the mediation program is the
actual session. For the complainant, it represents a chance to constructively
confront the police officer whose alleged behavior led to the complaint. And
for the officer, a mediation session offers a forum for speaking freely and
honestly, without fear of reprisal by department management.
Over and over again, we were able to see the positive results of a
successful mediation. Even in those cases mediators were unsure would
settle, certain behaviors occurred repeatedly. The most common act was a
hand extended across the table, often coupled with the words, "No hard
feelings." Neither civilian nor officer had a monopoly on this action, but it
was clear to the mediators that it represented an affirmative development.
Other actions included opening the door for a party's former adversary at
a session's end. While in civilized society this might be considered only
polite behavior, within the milieu of a CCRB complaint this can only be
considered as a sea change in a person's behavior. Civilian and police officer
enter the mediation room as adversaries, and this is clearly evident in their
body language-tense muscles, set facial expression, and sometimes the
clenching of the fist. For one of them to decide to return to mannered
behavior clearly indicates that a re-evaluation of the other has taken place.
Of course, sometimes the positive actions resulting from a mediation
surprise even the mediation staff. Two or three times, at least, after a
successful mediation, the officer volunteered to drive the complainant home.
While to a civilian this seems gracious and natural-the officer's command
is usually in the complainant's neighborhood-it is against the rules of the
65 In one instance, a complainant -and police officer mediated a complaint over a
year after the case was transferred to mediation, but the result was a resounding success.
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Patrol Guide, 66 the compendium of rules and regulations governing what a
police officer can and cannot do, especially if the ride will be in the officer's
patrol car. Nonetheless, it never became an issue.67
Finally, we found over time that some complainants-usually those who
were articulate, reflective, and thoughtful-were satisfied with "agreeing to
disagree." These civilians were able to make their case to the officer, even
though the officer may not have agreed with them, and were satisfied with
that result. Both parties were able to leave the mediation session with
positive feelings about their interaction.
V. WHAT DOESN'T WORK AND WHAT MIGHT MAKE IT BETTER?
A. Follow-up Training
Much effort is expended giving investigators training on how to handle
potentially mediable cases. A full day is allotted during their initial training
program to introducing them to the mediation process in place at the CCRB.
Special training sessions on how to handle objections to mediation by
complainants have been held frequently. And the mediation staff, from the
director to the associates, has always maintained an open door policy when
the investigative staff has questions. But I, and my successor, still found
serious problems with the way investigators presented mediation to
complainants.
One obvious reason for these problems is simply the sheer amount of
information about mediation that investigators need to know to be able to
present it intelligently to complainants. Most people innately understand the
concept of an investigation: its focus is a past incident that requires an
investigator to ask a complainant questions to develop the facts and
determine the credibility of both the witnesses and evidence unearthed in the
process. Mediation, on the other hand, is far less concerned with facts, and
focuses not on the past but on the future, with the central figure mediator
making no determinations on anything at all. For investigators, mediation
seemed like the opposite of investigation and for them to speak
knowledgeably and comfortably about the process to a civilian was like
writing a term paper in script with their nondominant hand-awkward and
66 See NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEP'T, NEW YORK CITY PATROL GUIDE 202-22
(2000).
67 Once, at the end of a successful mediation, the officer asked the complainant out
for coffee. The CCRB preferred to believe that this action was completely innocuous and
simply represented the officer's good feeling for the results of the mediation.
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trying. When you couple the seemingly contradictory nature of the
instruction on mediation we asked them to absorb in their training with the
speed we asked them to do it, it is no wonder that many gave less than stellar
presentations in the beginning.68
A second reason for the problems involved team management. It was
always clear to me that, while the handouts I prepared on the mediation
process would be helpful for investigators presenting mediation to a potential
participant, it would be surprising for any investigator to get it right from the
beginning. They needed follow-up training, and that follow-up training had
to come from the management team.
Team managers, supervisors, and assistant supervisors all received the
basic training in mediation and had experience with cases deemed to be
mediable. They knew, or should have known, the basics of the mediation
process and how to handle complainant objections. They should have given
follow-up training to their investigators, which would consist of listening to
investigators' taped phone conversations with civilians and giving feedback
on what was done correctly, along with what needed improvement.
Unfortunately, that was not the way it happened at the CCRB. In that real
world, the director of mediation would gather all of the cases recently
transferred to the mediation unit and listen to every taped conversation an
investigator had with a complainant. The goals were to determine whether:
investigation and mediation had been presented correctly and objectively to
the civilian; the investigator had dealt with any objections appropriately; the
complainant made an informed decision. Where there was an egregious error,
the director would consult first with the team manager or supervisor and then
bring in the offending investigator, along with those managers, to let them all
hear what was done poorly. Suggestions for improvement were always
supplied.
This practice was ineffective for a number of reasons. To begin with, it
required the director of mediation to spend a significant portion of the day
listening to tapes. The amount of time depended on the number of cases in
the unit's "in box" and the number of conversations the investigator taped.69
In addition to listening, the director needed to document the offending parts
68 To compound the difficulties, new investigators were often given potentially
mediable cases to cut their teeth on. Management felt these were "easier" cases that could
be handled by neophytes, something the mediation staff never agreed with.
69 While investigators were directed to cue the tapes to that section where they
presented the processes and handled any objections, they rarely complied. This required
the director to listen to much extraneous conversation, searching for the presentation he
needed to evaluate. It was not unusual to find two or three cassettes in a case file. It was
also not unusual to spend half the work day listening to the tapes.
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of the phone conversation, either by writing down the faulty parts of the
presentation 70 or by noting its place on the tape counter. And personalized,
targeted training had to be provided to the investigator in the subsequent
meeting. Unfortunately, poor presentations were not a rarity.
Some investigators reacted poorly to critiquing, and this seemed to be
correlated with the length of time they had been at the agency: the more
experienced investigators usually took the most umbrage. This was true even
when I went out of my way to explain that the critique was only meant to
improve their presentation.
Isaac Newton posited that every action has an equal and opposite
reaction. 71 We experienced something analogous: those investigators who
reacted poorly to the critique subsequently sent fewer cases to mediation or
stopped sending any at all, perhaps because they did not want to be
reprimanded again. This damaged the program because we learned early on
that roughly one in ten cases transferred to the mediation unit from
investigations actually resulted in a mediation. It was clear that in order to
mediate as many appropriate cases as possible, we needed to have a large
number of cases referred to the unit. That is because cases can and do fall off
the mediation docket as they make their way through the approval process.72
Agency management strongly encouraged investigators to offer
mediation whenever the complaint met the guidelines of the program.73 If
investigators decreased the number or stopped sending cases to the mediation
unit, the number of cases mediated each year would also decline-a result
that was clearly the opposite of the agency's goal of mediating as many
appropriate cases as possible. 74 But there was no way to prove investigators
70 This required repeated replaying of the tape to get the verbatim transcript, another
time-consuming task.
71 See Wikipedia, Newton's Laws of Motion,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newton'slaws-of motion (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
72 See infra pp. 27-32.
73 One way this was accomplished was by updating the agency's computer tracking
system with fields that appeared automatically if the case met mediation guidelines and
required investigators to note whether they offered mediation to the civilian or not.
74 See generally NYCLU: A SEVENTH ANNIVERSARY OVERVIEW OF THE CIVILIAN
COMPLAINT REV. BD (July 5, 1993-July 5, 2000), http://www.nyclu.org/ccrb7.html (last
visited Oct. 27, 2006). Some critics, notably the New York Civil Liberties Union, have
complained that the CCRB was depriving complainants of their right to an investigation
by offering mediation. This has never been the agency's policy, given that the mediation
process has always been voluntary for all parties. Board members, who make the final
disposition in every complaint, have articulated their awareness that any disposition they
make in a case will be unsatisfactory to one or more of the parties (and sometimes both),
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were purposely choosing to send fewer cases or not to send any at all, short
of reviewing every complaint that came into the agency, noting those that
seemed mediable on initial reading, 75 and following up to see what
investigators did with the recommendation-a Herculean task by any
standards and impossible given the limited resources of the mediation unit.
Ideally, team management would be reviewing all taped conversations
their investigators had with complainants in potential mediations. Poor
presentations would be corrected by individualized training at the team level.
In more serious cases, where the investigator's presentation was more than
just poor, more specialized instruction by the mediation unit staff would be
warranted. But this is not the real world, and the director of mediation still
reviews all tapes to see if the investigators have done a decent job.
B. Staffing Policies for the Mediation Unit
When I first came to the CCRB to implement the mediation program, I
was given a staff consisting of a clerical person who kept paper records and
three former investigators who made the calls to complainants. These
investigators, however, had been assigned to the mediation unit because they
were found to be incompetent to investigate complaints and were one step
away from termination if they remained on an investigative team. The
mediation unit accepted them because there were no other staff members
available. They were more of a millstone around the neck of the program
than a life preserver, and it was indicative of the mindset of the CCRB
management at the time that these employees were considered sufficient for
the needs of the mediation program.
Over the course of my tenure, the agency was finally able to terminate
two of those investigators, while one was transferred back to investigations
with limited responsibilities. For a while thereafter, the mediation program
was staffed solely by me and the clerical assistant. Finally, in August 2001, I
was able to hire a mediation coordinator who had a master's degree in
conflict resolution. This made eminent sense: if you need to answer questions
about mediation, you should have a background in the field. But agency
management decided against hiring any more employees with mediation
whereas mediation offers both the complainant and police officer the chance for greater
satisfaction. For that reason they are supportive of the mediation process and encourage
the investigators to offer mediation in all cases that meet the guidelines for the program,
not as a way to reduce the docket but as a process that affords greater satisfaction to all
concerned.
75 The initial complaint is often missing key information and sometimes is not even
an accurate description of the incident.
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skills and training. They preferred to transfer investigators to the unit who
already knew the way the agency functioned; these new mediation associates
learned mediation theory at one of the two annual trainings run by the
Columbia Law School mediation clinic.
It was a disappointment not to be able to hire mediators for positions in
the unit. Process knowledge and experience, and the confidence they give a
practitioner, could have clarified many issues complainants had about
mediation. No disrespect is meant toward the investigators who transferred to
the unit. They took the training and did as well as they could. But because
they had never actually mediated a case, they had no practical familiarity
with the process, tended to stay a limited period of time, and then moved on
to better jobs when they could, which always left the mediation unit back at
square one.
For a short period of time, the unit was staffed by the director, the
mediation coordinator, an experienced investigator, and a clerical who was
studying for a master's degree in public administration (the latter two were
trained in mediation but had no practical experience as mediators). This
arrangement turned out to be highly symbiotic because the investigator was
sharp, knowledgeable, articulate, and motivated. She was able to assist the
other staff members when investigatory questions arose, and the mediation
coordinator, with his theoretical and practical background in the field, was
able to help her and the clerical with questions about the process. The
clerical's great skill was the ability to engage most complainants in an almost
maternal fashion.
That experience leads me to suggest that the mediation unit as currently
constituted would work best when composed of trained, experienced
mediators and veteran investigators, in fairly equal proportions. If the unit is
staffed solely by former investigators, they will lack a depth of understanding
about the mediation process. Likewise, a unit composed solely of mediators
with no investigative experience will know all about the process but very
little about investigations or the culture of the police. A balanced
combination of investigators and mediators appears to produce the optimum
staffing quality required to run the mediation program most efficiently.
C. The Approval Gauntlet
Earlier it was stated that a number of approvals had to be secured before
a mediation associate could even begin to schedule a mediation. 76 After first
getting the complainant's consent, a case must be approved by the mediation
76 See supra note 69.
210
[Vol. 22:1 2006l
RESOLVING CIVILIAN-POLICE COMPLAINTS
unit, the NYPD Department Advocate's Office Management Analysis
Section, 77 and the CCRB's ADR committee before seeking the police
officer's consent. 78 This approval process was agreed to by the agency and
the police department prior to my arrival.
It is reasonable for the mediation unit to have input into whether a case is
mediable or not. There may be issues of a complainant's competency or
intractability that would make mediation a pointless exercise, and
experienced mediation staff members would be in the best position to
identify those issues. But the other required authorizations not only delay the
scheduling of the mediation, but can depend on factors that could be kindly
referred to as arbitrary and capricious.
It can be argued that the aim of getting the approval of the police
department and the ADR committee was to ensure that only suitable cases
got to mediation. But the addition of so many other hands in the approval
process not infrequently led to decisions that did not seem in the best interest
of the disputing parties. The police department and board see things from
different vantage points, and this led to cases that seemed eminently
mediable being ejected from the unit during this approval process.
During the early years of the program, for example, the police
department never bothered to inform us why they found a particular officer
unacceptable for mediation. We assumed it was due to other complaints filed
against the officer that were outside the jurisdiction of the CCRB, like
corruption. 79 Over time, we were able to learn that, while other complaints
might take an officer out of consideration for mediation,80 the department
also considered an officer's attendance record, sick leave frequency, and the
nature of the allegations in the CCRB case.
To understand why attendance and sick leave records might remove an
officer from consideration, it is necessary to understand that the police
department has a completely different philosophy about mediation than the
77 The Management Analysis Section was formerly called the Disciplinary
Assessment Unit and was a separate unit from the Department Advocate's Office.
7 8 JAN.-DEC. N.Y. CITY CMLIAN COMPLAINT REv. BD. STATUS REP. 8 (2003),
http://nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/ccrbann2003.pdf.
79 The NYPD's Internal Affairs Bureau has jurisdiction over allegations of
corruption.
80 For example, one female officer was found unacceptable in a case the mediation
unit thought was simply perfect for mediation. Conversations with the Disciplinary
Assessment Unit revealed that the officer had two prior complaints against her for
drawing her service revolver on her boyfriend. The mediation unit agreed with the
department in that case that putting the officer in a small room with the complainant and
mediator would not be reasonable.
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CCRB. While the agency believes all parties who are willing to mediate
should be given the opportunity to do so, for the department, mediation is a
perquisite that should be available only to police officers in good standing.81
An officer who takes an inordinate number of days off and is not considered
in good standing will not be found an acceptable candidate for mediation.
The CCRB always deferred to the police department's decision in such
matters, and such cases would be promptly returned to investigation. This
was true even in cases where it was fairly clear the disposition would be
"unsubstantiated. '82 The problem, of course, is with the term "good
standing," which has a decidedly elastic nature.
That the department also considers the nature of the allegations in a case
is more egregious. The original mediation agreement between the CCRB and
NYPD set forth the allegations that were to be considered mediable. 83 Under
Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly, we found the department rejecting
cases where a black or Hispanic slur was alleged. On further investigation,
we were told that the commissioner did not want such allegations mediated.
Rather, he wanted them investigated, with the possibility of punishment,
because he would not abide officers making such slurs. This was a unilateral
change in the original agreement which the board was not willing to pursue
as an issue. As it turned out, there were not that many allegations of black
and Hispanic slurs in cases transferred to mediation each year, which led the
ADR committee to defer to the police commissioner.
Approval by the ADR committee had its own problems. These issues
involved decisions on whether a particular officer should be allowed to
mediate and, again, it came down to philosophies. For example, in the early
years of the program, the city council designee, Charles M. Greinsky, who
stated he was "a community mediator and arbitrator for more than 25
years," 84 routinely refused to approve complaints involving "probationary
81 JAN.-DEC. N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BD. STATUS REP. 7 (2002),
http://nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/ccrbann2002.pdf (noting that officers with lengthy records
cannot participate).
82 Id. at 10. Cases are closed as unsubstantiated when "the weight of available
evidence is insufficient to substantiate, exonerate or unfound the allegation." Both
complainants and subject officers experience dissatisfaction with this disposition, since
neither one has been found more credible.
83 Id. at 4. Those allegations included use of force (where no injury or property
damage was alleged), abuse of authority allegations that were threat or intimidations, all
discourtesy allegations (cursing, rude gestures, nasty words) and all offensive language
allegations (slurs of an ethnic, religious, racial, gender, sexual orientation, or physically
challenged nature).
84 Id. at xi.
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officers"--those on the force for a year or less. He reasoned that if the new
officer got a complaint in the first year on the job, something was
intrinsically wrong with the officer, so he should be reprimanded sharply and
punished to correct the defect. Of course, a compelling argument could be
made that such an officer would be perfect for mediation, where some
retraining could take place and the chance to improve was available.
Surprisingly, given his background as a mediator, Greinsky was never moved
by the counterargument, and cases were usually dropped from mediation and
returned to investigations because of his strong feeling about not allowing
probationary officers with complaints to mediate.
For the mediation staff, Greinsky's argument made no sense, but it did
point out how susceptible the process was to personality and whim. It was
especially maddening to have a mediator stop cases from going to mediation,
but it was the way it worked in the real world. And it did not end with Mr.
Greinsky. All three board members who sat on the ADR committee would
reject cases from time to time, although not frequently. One of them would
usually argue that, based on patterns in the officer's CCRB history, an
investigation was preferable because if the allegations were true, punishment
was more desirable than resolution with the complainant. This thinking could
be said to turn the committee members into a form of judge and jury in the
case, making assumptions without the benefit of hearing the officer's
testimony or viewing any other evidence. 85 Again, it was difficult for the
mediation unit to accept their decisions, since there was never any guarantee
that a case would receive a particular disposition. The mediation staff always
felt it was best to allow the officer and civilian to meet to try to work out
their issues, because the possibility of gaining satisfaction from the result
was reasonably high.
After dealing with the mediation approval process for eight years, my
recommendation would be to discard the departmental and ADR committee
endorsements. Most cases are approved by both entities, and is it really that
important to return a small number of cases to investigations to seek
punishment of officers for what are, in the end, truly minor complaints?
These two approvals take a good amount of time to obtain, too. The
department is supposed to respond on a subject officer's acceptability in a
timely manner,86 but does not always comply with this requirement. And the
ADR committee meets once a month. If there is an issue, the case is put over
85 Cases transferred to mediation contain only the complainant's story of the case
and usually nothing more in terms of evidence or rebuttals.
86 Telephone Interview with Lt. Timothy I. Murphy, CCRB Liaison, NYPD
Department Advocate's Office (Sept. 7, 2006).
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to the next meeting time. It is not exceptional for the committee to hold a
case open for two months or more waiting for more information, like copies
of the other complaints on an officer's record. Such a delay often cools the
ardor of the civilian wanting to mediate (at this stage the police officer does
not even know about the process). I do not think the loss of these two
approvals would impact the mediation of any given complaint to a
measurable degree. On the contrary, if the officer agrees, the mediation could
take place much closer in time to the incident, which could increase the
satisfaction level for all concerned.
D. Communicating with the Officer
One final thought on what does not work and how to fix it: the
department officially prohibits CCRB investigators and mediation staff from
contacting police officers directly. 87 Everything is supposed to be done
through the liaison officer of the Management Analysis Section or the
NYPD's Appearance Control staff, a separate unit in each of New York
City's five boroughs that is supposed to notify police officers when they
must appear to testify in court, for a CCRB interview, and for mediation.
Appearance Control is notoriously unreliable for notifying officers. Even
calling the command directly to leave a message is not a trustworthy
technique. 88
Investigators frequently ignore the department's prohibition, calling
precincts directly to speak to the integrity control officer or the subject
officers themselves. Mediation staff took to circumventing the rule in 2002.
They would leave messages asking for a return call from the officer and
requesting that the officer leave his cell phone number if the officer did not
get to speak to a mediation staff member directly. Once we had the cell
phone number, we could talk to the officer directly, eliminating the
bureaucratic obstacle of Appearance Control.
The simplest solution would be for the NYPD to remove the prohibition
and allow mediation associates to contact officers directly. We could never
understand the reason for the prohibition in the first place. Our calls were
simply meant to give officers information about a process that could be
highly beneficial to them, answer their questions, and calm their fears. With
87 There is no official record of the NYPD's position, but it is common knowledge
within the CCRB.
88 It is not unusual for other officers at the command to erase or remove a notice to
the subject officer as a prank.
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this easy change in the rules, the NYPD could improve the efficiency of the
mediation program dramatically.
VI. THE EFFECT OF STAKEHOLDER EXPECTATIONS
Besides the civilian who makes the complaint and the officer who agrees
to mediate, there are four major stakeholders with a significant interest in the
mediation program: the NYPD, the agency's board, its administration, and
the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU). 89 The assumptions, beliefs,
and presuppositions of these four entities have the power to enhance or
weaken the mediation process offered at the CCRB, and an examination of
their positive and negative expectations will show the extent to which that
takes place.
A. The NYPD
One positive expectation held by police department management is that
mediated complaints represent a better way of resolving civilian complaints
against police officers than investigation. This makes good sense from the
police perspective. An investigation leads to a disposition, an entry on the
officer's history, and the possibility of an administrative trial. Not only does
an investigation and its aftermath take an officer away from his work, but it
diminishes his morale and affects his ability to be promoted, change details,
and sometimes to even keep his job. If the officer successfully mediates his
complaint, there are no such negative results. And this expectation is very
good for the program, because as long as the department maintains this
belief, mediating complaints can continue. It is absolutely dependent on the
support of police management, beginning with the commissioner.
Another positive belief that police managers hold is that officers may
learn from the experience. The mediation staff believes this fervently too,
and has seen it happen. For example, officers often speak in what they feel is
a business tone when talking to civilians, but civilians can find the tone harsh
or arrogant. Over my time at the CCRB, the agency received a good number
of complaints about "the way the officer talked to me." While officers may
think their tone was professional, civilians are more than willing to explain
how abusive it sounds to a listener, and hopefully the officers will learn from
this experience. This belief in the instructive power of mediation also
89 See About The NYCLU, http://www.nyclu.org/about.html (last visited Oct. 21,
2006). The New York Civil Liberties Union was founded in 1951 as the New York
affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union.
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supports the continuance of the mediation program. Anything that helps the
officer learn how to be better is a plus from the police vantage point.
There is a final pragmatic, positive expectation. If officers mediate
successfully, there will be no need to discipline them or to utilize the police
resources dedicated to regulating the rank and file. That represents a cost
saving that is greatly desirable.90 And from the CCRB perspective, it is
another factor that keeps the department supportive of the mediation
program.
But every yin has its yang. Two expectations can be considered to
weaken the program, and both have been discussed earlier. The less serious
one concerns the department's decision to reject officers as unacceptable in
complaints involving allegations of black or Hispanic slurs. 91 While this
decreases the number of complaints the CCRB can consider mediating, the
number of complaints actually affected by this decision has been small. Still,
the unilateral decision of the department does take some cases out of the
mediation program. As was mentioned earlier, a larger pool of potentially
mediable cases at the beginning of the approval process leads to more cases
actually being mediated, so anything that diminishes the initial number of
cases would be a detriment to the program.92
From the CCRB perspective, the departmental expectation with more
serious consequences concerns how the NYPD views mediation. 93 A belief
that only officers in good standing should be offered mediation directly
affects the number of complaints that can be mediated. It also stands in
opposition to the CCRB's philosophy that mediation is a beneficial process
for resolving all complaints that fall within the guidelines, not simply a
"perk" for officers who behave well. And once again, a diminished, initial
pool of potentially mediable cases inevitably leads to fewer complaints
reaching the mediation table where the issues can be resolved. This result
goes against the purported interest of the NYPD in mediating, rather than
investigating, civilian complaints against officers, and it remains difficult to
see why this departmental expectation is still in place.
90 If a case is investigated, a panel of board members must review it and make the
final disposition. They get paid $250 for each six hour time period they work. If the case
is substantiated, the NYPD's Department Advocate's Office must review it and
determine the punishment, if any. If there is a trial, the parties need attorneys and the
DAO must supply an ALJ. All of this costs money, which is not spent if the case is
mediated.
91 See supra Part V.C and accompanying notes.
92 Id.
93 See supra Part V.D and accompanying notes.
216
[Vol. 22:1 2006]
RESOLVING CIVILIAN-POLICE COMPLAINTS
B. The Board
The actual CCRB has thirteen members and probably as many
viewpoints on issues affecting the agency. This is only natural for a board
whose members are selected by governmental entities not always in harmony
with each other. Yet there has emerged a consensus of sorts on the mediation
program, albeit with some board members more fervent than others about the
board's expectations.
No mediation program could run at the CCRB without the board's
support, and an important expectation voiced on more than one occasion by
board members is that complainants and police officers are often better
served by mediation than investigation. The closer the board members are to
the mediation program, the more likely they are to ardently believe that
statement, and the ADR committee members were the firmest in this
conviction.
Board members read hundreds of cases a month, and they are quite
aware that not only is it difficult to prove an allegation against a police
officer,94 but many times neither complainant nor officer is more credible or
has the facts that meet the preponderance of evidence standard for the board
to find in their favor.95 This causes great dissatisfaction for the civilian and,
where neither party has the evidence or credibility to prevail, for the officer,
too. They do not feel they were heard or believed. The board members
realize that if these same civilians and officers were able to mediate the
complaint, the chance for satisfaction would be much higher, the outcome
could be more positive, and the parties would have more respect for the
process that gave them that satisfaction.
To varying degrees, board members also believe that the satisfaction
levels of mediation participants are higher than for those who participate in
an investigation. Satisfaction comes in two flavors at the CCRB: satisfaction
with the process and satisfaction with the substance or result.96 Process
satisfaction is dependent on how well the complainant or police officer was
treated by the CCRB staff and includes such factors as the timeliness of the
process, its fairness, the quality of communications from the
94 In many CCRB complaints only one civilian and one police officer are involved.
In the absence of any hard evidence, these cases often become he said-she said scenarios.
95 JAN.-JuNE N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLIANT REV. BD. STATUS REP. 14 (2005).
Allegations such as these are usually disposed of as unsubstantiated. In the latest CCRB
status report (as of July 2006) for January to June 2005, 25% of all fully investigated
allegations were found to be unsubstantiated.
96 See supra Part II.
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investigator/mediation associate to the complainant, and the degree to which
the person's special needs were accommodated. 97 Both investigators and
mediation associates strive to give parties the most satisfaction possible when
it comes to process.
As for satisfaction with the substance-the results of the process-only
the mediation staff can say that this is their goal. Participants in mediation
should always feel they were heard, and hopefully were able to resolve the
issues between them. Investigators are hampered because they simply cannot
say their goal is to satisfy the complainant or the officer with respect to the
result. And for complainants, the only satisfactory result is a substantiated
allegation. Thus, it often happens that complainants are highly dissatisfied
with the substantive results of an investigation. 98 For the mediation process,
with its over 90% success rate for those cases that make it to the table,99
substantive satisfaction is high-not 100%, but high all the same.
These two positive expectations on the board's part enhance the
mediation program because they engender support for the process and
encourage the investigative staff to send all cases that fit the guidelines to
mediation. They also increase the morale of the mediation unit staff because
of the board's publicly stated program approval.100
But there is a negative expectation, too, that acts to weaken the mediation
program. This belief comes directly from one of the board's positive
expectations: if civilians and officers are often better served by mediation
than investigation, then it must follow that more cases should be mediated.
97 The CCRB's offices are located at the southern end of Manhattan, and while there
are many subway lines with stops in the area, along with bus routes, for some
complainants it is a difficult journey. The agency allows investigators to hold their
interviews outside its offices if that is more convenient for complainants, and pays for car
services to bring and return mediation participants who have a long trip. In addition, the
city of New York has residents who speak all languages. The agency uses AT&T's
translation services on phone calls and has a contract for interpretation services for
interviews if necessary. Periodically, a list of the investigative staff and the languages
they are fluent in is published, so that their services may also be used for translation
purposes.
9 8 JAN.-DEC. N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLIANT REV. BD. STATUS REP. 83 (2004).
Between 2000 and 2004, for example, an annual average of about 12% of all cases
(averaging 256 cases per year) fully investigated by the CCRB contained one or more
substantiated allegations.
99 Id. at 23. There were 113 successful mediations in 2004 and 5 that went to
impasse, resulting in a 96% success rate for those cases that made it to the mediation
table.
10 0 See TRANSCRIPT OF THE PUBLIC MEETING OF THE CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BD.
10-12 (Jan. 11, 2006), http://nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/cc_2006-01_ 1.pdf.
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This statement, which seems logical on first glance, would be a truism if
complaints could be funneled to mediation at will, with no other
considerations. The argument is simple: if it's better to mediate, well then,
let's just send more cases to mediation. But the statement fails to take into
account that the process is voluntary on the part of the complainant and the
officer, so even cases that look perfect for mediation and theoretically should
reach a satisfactory settlement will not necessarily get to the mediation table.
And the expectation ignores the approval process, where otherwise ideal
cases for mediation are also removed from the system.
Nevertheless, the expectation is there, and if the number of cases going
to mediation does not increase, pressure is brought on agency management to
get those numbers up. But here's the rub-I stated before that one of the side
effects of the current protocol of critiquing investigators who make poor
presentations is that they start sending fewer or no cases to mediation. 101
This intentional act is harmful and should be dealt with on an individual basis
with the particular investigator. The investigators who make a good faith
effort to present mediation well and encourage complainants to choose
mediation where appropriate, and yet have complainants decline to
participate, also wind up sending fewer cases to mediation, but through no
fault of their own. The board's expectation, however, pushes agency
management to address both scenarios with the same directives--either more
training for the investigative staff or sharp reprimands to team management.
This has a deleterious effect on the investigators trying to do the right thing
because the fault does not lie with them, but with the hardened positional
stance of the complainant. When all is said and done, if someone does not
want to change their mind, no amount of cajoling or gullying can make that
person see it differently. Sending investigators, who are following the
guidelines and attempting to counter objections as the agency instructed, for
more training makes them feel their work was unacceptable, leads to lower
morale, and lessens motivation.
C. The CCRB Administration
It is not surprising that the expectations of the agency's management
closely parallel those of the board. The executive staff must answer to a
board that, at least for my tenure at the CCRB, has not been averse to
micromanaging. This can cause much tension at the highest levels of the
agency because the board may have the last word as a matter of law but
101 See supra Part V.A.
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certainly may not get it right. 102 Because everything flows downhill in an
organization, tense management spreads that ill feeling to the rest of the staff,
making the work environment very uncomfortable. In my early years at the
agency, the friction between some members of the board and agency
management was palpable, and the monthly board meetings had all the
appeal of surgery without anesthesia. 10 3
The problem can probably be traced to the original set-up of the
independent CCRB. In other city agencies, the agency commissioner sits on
the agency board (if there is one) as the chair. At the CCRB, the executive
director reports to the board. That gives the executive director far less power
than other city commissioners, including no voting rights. Ideally, the
executive director should be the chair of the CCRB with a vote and more
ability to influence what the board does. But because the executive director
must answer to the board, any expectations the board has tended to become
the agency's expectations, too, simply for survival reasons.
Clearly, the agency administration believes as the board does that parties
are better served by mediation than investigation, especially in those cases
that would probably be closed as unsubstantiated. It would not be in the
agency's interest to provide a service to the public or the police that
consistently disappoints them.10 4 With a 7% substantiation rate for
102 For example, in the last half of the 1990s the board members decided that they
should be called commissioners. When the then-deputy executive director for
administration researched the issue and informed them that protocol held they could not
do that, since none of them had received commissions from the city, they simply ignored
her. The truth is they are simply board members, but their nameplates, prominent at every
public meeting, to this day say "Commissioner."
103 The board has changed a number of times since I started in December 1996, and
although some of the old lions are still there, its relationship with agency management
has mellowed somewhat. This is not to say that board members are no longer capable of
making outrageous demands or demonstrating an appalling lack of understanding of
agency matters-they can and they do.
104 CCRB administration has tried on many occasions to explain to the public that
they cannot guarantee that complaints will be substantiated. What the agency can offer is
an investigation that is thorough, fair and timely. Objectively, that is all the CCRB can
give the public, but that public is often scornful of anything short of a finding in its favor.
While the agency can be proud of offering well-executed investigations, negative public
response is never pleasant to hear. Mediation, with its win-win goal and high success
rate, offers the possibility of more positive public regard for the agency, although the
actual number of mediated cases is still quite small compared to the number of
investigations.
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allegations fully investigated during the first half of 2005,105 a 36%
exoneration rate, 106 and a 19% unfounded rate, 107 we can comfortably
assume that many civilians were disappointed with the investigative process.
The 25% unsubstantiated rate for the same time period suggests that many
officers were probably unsatisfied, too.10 8  Management's positive
expectation, strongly supported by the agency's own data, enhances the
mediation program by making it a desirable alternative to investigation.
As stated earlier, though, the board maintains the expectation that if
mediation serves the parties better than investigation, then more cases should
be mediated, and this becomes the agency's expectation, too. 109
Unfortunately, that leads to a corollary negative expectation on the part of
agency management: if the number of cases mediated does not increase, the
investigative and mediation staffs are not performing satisfactorily.
There is no question the possibility exists that a particular investigator or
mediation associate may err or blunder in a given situation, but such failures
are not the sole cause of cases not going to mediation. Complainants (who
agreed to mediation in only 46% of all eligible cases in 2005)110 may be
unpersuaded by even the best presentation. The department and the ADR
committee may find reasons to reject a case and the subject officer may
believe she can prove she did not commit misconduct. None of these reasons
is the fault of the investigator.
Agency administration needs to learn that the mediation process may be
self-limiting in the sense that not everyone is going to want to participate in
it, and that is okay. The voluntary nature of the program means a
complainant or officer can decline to mediate for any reason, including
whim, with the same result-the case does not go to mediation. Thus,
management should encourage mediation in all appropriate circumstances,
train staff to present the process clearly and well, but accept gracefully if the
case fails to go to mediation for reasons outside the investigator's control.
1 0 5 JAN.-JUNE N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLIANT REV. BD. STATUS REP. 14 (2005),
http://nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/ccrbsemi2005.pdf.
1 0 6 Id. A disposition of exonerated means the board found the officer did what the
complainant said, but was justified in doing so. Id. at 8.107 Id. at 14. An unfounded disposition means the board believed the allegation
never occurred. Id. at 8.
10 8 Id. at 14.
109 See supra Part VI.B.
110 N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BD. ANALYSIS OF MEDIATION PROGRAM
2005 COMPLAINTS [AS OF 01/06/06] (2005).
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D. The New York Civil Liberties Union
While I was at the CCRB, the NYCLU was the most important and
consistent critic of the agency. Its executive director at the time, Norman
Siegel, regularly harangued the board at its public meetings regarding the
agency's alleged deficiencies and failures. Month after month in the late
1990s, Mr. Siegel would take the floor and castigate board members and the
executive director, playing directly to the media who followed him like
sharks to chum.
The NYCLU, and Mr. Siegel in particular, played a large role in events
leading up to the passage of the law making the CCRB independent from the
police department.Il' To hear Mr. Siegel tell the story, one would think his
testimony alone persuaded the city council to pass the legislation; but of
course he was only one of many witnesses who felt strongly that oversight of
the police should be in civilian hands.112
I cannot think of any positive expectations the NYCLU had that affected
the mediation program. This was no doubt due to the philosophical
differences between the CCRB and the NYCLU. It was clear that Siegel and
the NYCLU saw the CCRB as an advocate for civilians complaining about
the police. Mr. Siegel habitually complained about the agency's low
substantiation rate, relating it to poor investigations. It was obvious that the
only way the CCRB could pass muster for the NYCLU was to increase the
substantiation rate-i.e., find more officers guilty of misconduct.
But the CCRB is a quasi-adjudicative body. Its task is to thoroughly
investigate complaints fairly and in a timely manner, not to take sides, and to
make a determination as to whether an officer is guilty of misconduct.
Dispositions are based on the merits of the case, not on an agreed-upon goal.
The agency has never sought to increase its substantiation rate, an objective
that goes against any idea of fairness. The NYCLU is famous for taking on
causes that to some seem outrageous but fit its mission to protect human
rights well. Nevertheless, it is impossible to imagine the NYCLU, and Mr.
Siegel in particular, going into a criminal court anywhere in the country and
reprimanding the judge because her conviction rate was too low. Yet that was
essentially what he did every time he castigated the CCRB for its low
substantiation rate.
S11 See, e.g., Testimony of the New York Civil Liberties Union Before New York
City Council Committee on Public Safety About the Civilian Complaint Review Board,
Mar. 21, 2006, http://www.nyclu.org/ccrb tstmnyr_032106.html.
112 See James C. McKinley, Jr., Deep Divisions on Policing the Police, NY TIMES,
Oct. 3, 1992, § 1 at 27.
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The NYCLU did have two negative expectations that seemed to ignore
any of the good results mediation was able to achieve in a case. The first was
the presumption that the CCRB was denying justice to those people who
mediate their complaints-"justice" in this sense means finding in the
complainant's favor. Considering that the average substantiation rate for all
fully investigated allegations for the five-year period between 2000 and 2004
was just 8%, i 13 justice was denied 92% of the time.1 14 Less than 2% of all
cases closed during those years were mediated. 115
It is difficult to see how the mediation process denied justice, since the
odds of prevailing were and remain small. The NYCLU, though, clung to this
belief even though civilians who do not mediate are likely to reap little
satisfaction from the process. To deny the positive results of mediation
makes the NYCLU look shortsighted and small-minded, unless you
recognize that this position is the only possible one it could take according to
the group's basic premise that the CCRB should be an advocate for
complainants.
Finally, the NYCLU maintains the negative belief that the rights of
complainants who mediate are being ignored. This is simply not true since
the CCRB specifically exempts from consideration for mediation those
complaints where a civilian alleges personal injury, property damage, or
both. The agency is quite aware that most complainants are pro se, and the
agency does not want to put them in the position of waiving any claim of
damages they may be entitled to.1 1 6 All cases found mediable contain
allegations that would not be subject to suit.11 7 Contrary to the NYCLU's
contention, no rights are bargained away in the mediation process, and the
agency cannot be accused of ignoring such entitlements.
113 JAN.-DEC. N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLIANT REV. BD. STATUS REP. 84 (2004),
http://nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/ccrbann2004.pdf.
114 Id. at 83-84. From 2000 through 2004 the CCRB closed 24,168 complaints, fully
investigating 10,898 cases that contained 38,090 allegations. A complaint can have more
than one allegation. There were 3,066 substantiated allegations.
115 Id. at 83. During the same period 352 cases were mediated, representing 1.5% of
all closed cases.
116 The standard resolution agreement, developed for the program by the New York
City Law Department, contains a waiver and release for any future claims arising from
the incident that led to the complaint. The waiver and release applies to all parties in the
complaint, the NYPD, and the City of New York.
117 For example, some past complaints that were mediated contained the simple
allegation that the officer was rude to the civilian. Such an allegation, which often
involves the officer telling the civilian to "shut up," could be stinging and painful for the
complainant but not actionable, in the legal sense.
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These negative expectations on the part of the NYCLU, however,
diminish the mediation program. They affect the morale of the investigative
and mediation staffs who hear NYCLU representatives disparage the
program at public board meetings. More significantly, although this cannot
be decisively proven,' NYCLU clients-who are encouraged to file
complaints with the agency-cannot help but be affected by their attorney's
disapproving view of the CCRB's mediation program. It is highly likely that
such clients will decline the opportunity to mediate, losing the chance to
resolve their complaint satisfactorily.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
On paper, the CCRB's mediation program appears to be an attractive
alternative to the investigative process offered to complainants, offering the
possibility of a higher level of satisfaction for both the civilian and the police
officer. According to the scheme devised by the agency and the NYPD, cases
that meet mediation guidelines should move smoothly from investigations
through the approval process, coming to a scheduled mediation in a timely
manner. Complaints containing some factor making them inappropriate for
mediation should be able to be identified during that approval process, thus
ensuring that the cases that actually make it to the mediation table have a
very good chance of resolving successfully.
In reality, like all systems devised by human minds, the mediation
process does have some features that work extremely well, but has other
components that do not. In addition, the expectations of the entities with a
stake in the mediation process have the abilities to enhance or weaken the
program. Like a chemical reaction in equilibrium, the degree to which the
mediation process appears to be working wellI 8 or poorly1 9 is influenced
by any changes that occur to the reactants-the parties, management and
staff of the CCRB, and the board itself-and the environment where it takes
place, which in this case would be the stakeholders' expectations.
Left to itself, a chemical reaction in equilibrium will produce some
product, but not as much as, say, the shareholders in a chemical company
would like. The goal of the chemist attending to that reaction is to manipulate
118 Positive indicators include a large number of cases transferred from
investigations, a small number of complaints rejected during the approval process, and a
resulting higher number of successfully mediated complaints each year.
119 Negative indicators would include a drop in the number of cases transferred from
investigations, a larger number of complaints rejected during the approval process, and a
decreasing number of successfully mediated complaints from year to year.
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the reactants and environment so as to obtain as much product as possible.
This analogy is an apt one for the CCRB's mediation program. With no
intervention, the process will lead to a number of mediations, but not as
many as the CCRB would like. If team managers did more follow-up
mediation training with their investigators, agency management staffed the
mediation unit with more mediators, the approval process was streamlined,
and the NYPD let mediation associates contact officers directly, more
successful mediations would be possible. The number should increase even
more if the positive expectations of the process stakeholders' were
emphasized and the negative expectations limited.
But like any system in equilibrium, it is not possible to get all product,
just an increase when conditions are right. The CCRB will never be able to
get all the cases it thinks are mediable to a successful mediation outcome.
There are just too many factors to control, so the agency should concentrate
on optimizing those features it can.
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